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CAVITY FILLING OR ROOT CANAL?
HOW COURTS SHOULD APPLY NORTH CAROLINA STATE
BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS V. FTC

ABSTRACT
This Comment argues that federal courts and the FTC should narrowly
construe a recent Supreme Court decision restricting the scope of the antitrust
state-action doctrine. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners, the
Supreme Court held that state boards controlled by active market participants
must receive active state supervision to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.
Notably, the majority opinion did not provide a test for determining whether
active market participants control a state agency. Nor did it offer guidance on
the adequate level of supervision states must provide to satisfy the active
supervision requirement.
Fortunately, states and courts can look to an FTC Staff Guidance
Statement and the Parker doctrine as polestars for answering the questions left
open by the Court. The FTC Staff Guidance Statement provides insights into
how to identify when active market participants control a state board. The
Parker doctrine supports a presumption that a state supervisory scheme is
adequate when it satisfies the four constant requirements identified by Justice
Kennedy in N.C. Dental. Taken together, the FTC Staff Guidance Statement
and the Parker doctrine suggest that N.C. Dental is amenable to an
interpretation that does not eviscerate the antitrust state-action doctrine.
What’s more, strong policy reasons support an interpretation of N.C.
Dental that does not unduly trammel states’ rights. To be sure, statesanctioned cartels in the form of licensing commissions and regulatory boards
represent a pervasive problem in the United States economy. Nonetheless, this
Comment argues that N.C. Dental need not portend the demise of antitrust
federalism, especially as it applies in the context of state health care
regulation. Supreme Court precedent and structural principles that undergird
the Constitution weigh in favor of an interpretation and application of N.C.
Dental that does not vitiate the antitrust state-action exemption. Additionally,
even when immunity fails, courts should adopt a recently proposed “modified
rule-of-reason analysis” for cases involving state regulatory boards. This
approach maximizes the holding’s upside while avoiding the downside of
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disrupting states’ regulatory regimes in sensitive industries such as health care
and medical regulation.
INTRODUCTION
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the
states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally
subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a
state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
attributed to Congress. 1

Recently, a considerable amount of economic and legal commentary has
focused on a controversial but ubiquitous practice: state delegation of
regulatory authority to private actors. 2 Much of this commentary has been
negative, and rightfully so. When a state delegates regulatory authority over an
industry or profession to persons who are active market participants in that
same industry, a stark conflict of interest arises because those private delegates
might “confuse[] their own interests with the State’s policy goals.” 3 Put
bluntly, delegating regulatory authority to active market participants invites
self-dealing. 4
The purported benefit of occupational licensing is that it helps improve the
safety and quality of goods and services offered in a state. 5 However, recent
studies suggest that, despite an explosion in occupational licensing regimes
throughout the United States, 6 these regimes yield only marginal safety and
quality benefits and, further, increase the prices of goods and services 7 and

1

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
See, e.g., Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1095–96 (2014); Alexander Volokh, The New PrivateRegulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust Challenges, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
931, 932 (2014).
3 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015).
4 Id.
5 Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1098.
6 Today, “nearly a third of American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and this
trend toward licensing is continuing.” Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1096. In the 1950s, only approximately
5% of the United States workforce needed a license for their occupation. Id.
7 Id. at 1098 (“Kleiner, the leading economist studying the effects of licensing on price and quality of
service, estimates that licensing costs consumers $116 to $139 billon every year.”).
2
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reduce job availability. 8 In other words, empirical evidence indicates that the
costs of occupational licensing far exceed the benefits. 9
At first blush, the Sherman Act appears an effective tool for addressing the
problem of private-regulatory delegations. After all, occupational licensing is a
deliberate restriction of competition, and the entities that impose these
restraints closely resemble a prime target of the antitrust laws: cartels. 10 Yet,
because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parker v. Brown, 11 the Sherman
Act often has trouble reaching licensing boards that enact anticompetitive
restraints under the auspices of state authority. 12
Parker established that acts of state legislatures are automatically immune
from the Sherman Act. 13 Two later cases, Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 14 and Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 15 addressed
the status of private actors and municipalities within the antitrust state-action
doctrine. In Midcal, the Supreme Court formally established a two-pronged
test for private actors to obtain immunity: (1) they must act pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy to displace competition (the “clear articulation”
requirement); and (2) the state must actively supervise the conduct of private
actors to whom it has delegated the authority to displace competition (the
“active supervision” requirement). 16 In Town of Hallie, the Court held that
municipalities only need to satisfy the first, clear articulation prong because
“[w]here the actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is
involved in a private price-fixing arrangement.” 17

8 Id. (“Labor economists have shown that the net effect of licensing on quality is equivocal.” (citing
CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION 21–27, 40 (1990), http://www.ramblemuse.com/articles/cox_foster.pdf).
9 Id.
10 See Timothy Sandefur, Freedom of Competition and the Rhetoric of Federalism: North Carolina Board
of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196.
11 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parker Court considered whether the Sherman Act could reach a California
regulatory program that restricted competition among raisin growers. Id. at 344. The Court held that although
private actors could not agree to limit supply and stabilize prices in this way, the Congress that enacted the
Sherman Act never intended to restrain state action. Id. at 350–52.
12 See, e.g., id. at 352, 368. “Parker immunity” and “antitrust state-action exemption” are used
interchangeably throughout this Comment. It is also important to note that state-action in the context of the
Parker antitrust doctrine is entirely distinct from the concept of state-action under the fourteenth amendment.
13 Id. at 352.
14 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
15 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
16 Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
17 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
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Parker, Midcal, and Town of Hallie establish “three categories of stateaction antitrust immunity:” (1) state legislatures enjoy complete immunity
without having to satisfy either prong of Midcal; (2) municipalities need only
satisfy the first prong by showing that they acted pursuant to a clearly
articulated policy; and (3) private actors must satisfy both the clear articulation
and active state supervision prongs. 18
A footnote in Town of Hallie suggested that “true [(i.e. public)] state
agencies” should be treated the same as municipalities for purposes of Parker
immunity. 19 Though it was dictum, courts generally adhered to this principle. 20
However, “determining whether an actor is sufficiently ‘public’ so as not to
require supervision has often proven difficult.” 21 Indeed, until 2015, there was
a three-way circuit split on this issue. 22 Then, in North Carolina State Board of
Dental Examiners v. FTC (N.C. Dental), the Supreme Court resolved the split,
at least partially. 23
In N.C. Dental, the Court held that state boards controlled by active market
participants must satisfy the active supervision requirement to receive Parker
immunity. 24 Because “[state] boards [throughout the United States] are
typically dominated by active members of the very profession that they are
tasked with regulating,” 25 the effect of this holding is significant: assuming
states want to immunize their boards from antitrust suit, they will need to
either reorganize or “actively supervise” boards that previously did not require

18 Alexander Volokh, Are the Worst Kinds of Monopolies Immune From Antitrust Law?: FTC v. North
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners and the State-Action Exemption, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 119, 125
(2015); see also David Gringer, Antitrust Treatment of State Licensing Boards in the Wake of North Carolina
State Board of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 24 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC.
ST. B. CAL., Fall 2015, at 50, 50 (“State action immunity offers its most robust protection where the actor in
question is the state acting as sovereign.”).
19 Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 (1985) (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active
state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.”).
20 Volokh, supra note 18, 125 (“Courts all agree with the Town of Hallie dictum that true state agencies
fall into [the same] category [as municipalities] . . . .”); see also United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 921
(2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[F]ootnotes are part of an opinion, too, even
if not the most likely place to look for a key jurisdictional ruling.”).
21 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 226b, at 166 (3d ed. 2006).
22 Volokh, supra note 18, at 126; see infra text accompanying notes 69–71.
23 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015).
24 Id. (“A state board on which a controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in
the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision requirement in order to invoke
state-action antitrust immunity.”).
25 Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1103.
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supervision. 26 Moreover, the active supervision requirement is more difficult to
satisfy than the clear articulation requirement. 27 As such, N.C. Dental restricts
the scope of the antitrust state-action doctrine, though it remains to be seen
how expansively the FTC and lower courts will apply the decision. 28
Some commentators view N.C. Dental as a step in the right direction in the
fight against state-sanctioned cartels. 29 Others, however, have expressed
concern at the potential threat the decision poses to the predominant model of
state economic regulation and, in particular, state health care regulation. 30
Professional self-regulation, such as doctors regulating doctors or lawyers
regulating lawyers, has existed since the mid-nineteenth century. 31That this
practice continues to this day, with every state relying to some extent on
professional self-regulation, is not surprising: delegating regulatory authority
to persons with experience in a particular field enables states to draw upon
these individuals’ expertise in formulating their regulatory policies. 32 Because
it restricts the scope of the Parker immunity, N.C. Dental may make
professionals reluctant to serve on state regulatory boards, thereby interfering
with the states’ ability to regulate such internal affairs. Thus, the decision
implicates federalism concerns at the heart of the antitrust state-action doctrine.
Indeed, Parker embodies the structural constitutional principle that states are
entitled to a significant amount of authority as co-sovereigns under our
federalist system. 33

26

N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
See Volokh, supra note 18, at 124–26.
28 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114; Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (describing the twopronged test as “rigorous”).
29 See, e.g., Sasha Volokh, Victory against Big Dentistry! The Antitrust Story, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/02/25/
victory-against-big-dentistry-the-antitrust-story/.
30 See Kathleen Foote, Immune No Longer: State Professional Boards Consider Their Options, 30
ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 55, 56; Colin R. Kass, Scott M. Abeles & John Ingrassia, Has the Supreme Court
Thrown Health Care Regulation into Disarray? A Comment on the Court’s Reworking of the State Action
Doctrine, 30 ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 58, 61; see also Roxann E. Henry, Antitrust and the Judiciary, 30
ANTITRUST, Fall 2015, at 3, 3 (“The impact of North Carolina Dental on the state action exemption will affect
a wide range of industries with representatives on state regulatory boards.”).
31 See N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“When the States first created medical and
dental boards, well before the Sherman Act was enacted, they began to staff them in this way.” (citing SAMUEL
S. WHITE, HISTORY OF ORAL AND DENTAL SCIENCE IN AMERICA 197–214 (1876))).
32 Id. at 1122 (“It is reasonable for States to decide that the individuals best able to regulate technical
professions are practitioners with expertise in those very professions.”).
33 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 (1987) (“To be sure, our
Constitution does embody structural principles of federalism and sovereignty.”).
27
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In addition to these federalism concerns, the holding in N.C. Dental raised
two key questions. First, what constitutes a controlling number of active
market participants: only a majority, or perhaps a minority that sets a board’s
agenda or generally gets its way? 34 Second, what constitutes active state
supervision? In other words, if a state decides to comply with N.C. Dental by
subjecting its regulatory boards to “active state supervision,” what must that
supervision entail? As to this latter question, the majority gleaned from
Parker’s progeny four “constant requirements” for satisfying the active state
supervision requirement:
[1] The supervisor must review the substance of the anticompetitive
decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it; [2] the
supervisor must have the power to veto or modify particular decisions
to ensure they accord with state policy; [3] the “mere potential for
state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the
State” . . . [and 4] the state supervisor may not itself be an active
market participant. 35

To be sure, the majority ultimately characterized the inquiry as “flexible
and context-dependent,” and stated that “the adequacy of supervision
otherwise will depend on all the circumstances of a case.” 36 Although the
Court acknowledged that “[a]ctive supervision need not entail day-to-day
involvement in an agency’s operations or micromanagement of its every
decision,” 37 the decision nonetheless left states wondering what else might be
required to satisfy the active supervision requirement. 38
To help resolve some of these questions, several state officials requested
guidance from the FTC on how to interpret and comply with the holding. 39 The
34 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting). The dissent also posed additional questions. For
example, “who is an active market participant” and “what is the scope of the market in which a member may
not participate while serving on the board?” Id. These questions are addressed in Part II.
35 Id. at 1116–17 (citations omitted) (quoting FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 638 (1992)). The
four constants can be summarized as follows: (1) substantive review; (2) power to veto or modify; (3) decision
by state official; (4) supervisor not itself an active market participant.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 N.C. Dental is not the first case where Justice Kennedy failed to provide meaningful guidance on the
dictates of the active supervision requirement. In FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance, 504 U.S. 621 (1992), Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent criticized Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion for not explaining “just how active a
State’s regulators must be before the ‘active supervision’ requirement will be satisfied.” Id. at 644 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
39 FED. TRADE COMM’N, STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS
CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter STAFF GUIDANCE STATEMENT], https://www.
ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/active_supervision_of_state_boards.pdf.
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FTC responded by issuing a non-binding “Staff Guidance Statement,” 40 which
stated that the Commission would apply N.C. Dental “reasonably and
flexibly.” 41 Understandably, this assurance is cold comfort to state legislators
and prospective professional regulators: over the last twenty-five years, the
Supreme Court sided with the FTC in all three of the Parker cases it decided,
each of which narrowed the scope of the antitrust state-action doctrine. 42
Moreover, even if the Commission could somehow guarantee that it would
focus its enforcement efforts on agencies engaged in egregious conduct, N.C.
Dental still opens the courthouse doors for private plaintiffs to bring antitrust
suits against state boards and their members. 43 Indeed, the plaintiffs’ bar has
already started taking advantage of this opportunity. 44
Fortunately, there are several persuasive arguments for why N.C. Dental
need not dissuade private actors from serving on state boards. The most
problematic aspect of the holding—the amorphous standard established for the
active supervision requirement—is amenable to a practical, and legally
supportable, solution: federal courts should regard a supervisory system that
satisfies the four constant requirements identified by Justice Kennedy as
presumptively adequate. 45 Although Justice Kennedy intimated that these
requirements were merely necessary, this Comment argues that courts should
adopt a presumption that these constants are sufficient. Supreme Court
precedent and policy considerations support this claim.
Although the majority opinion is consistent with the Court’s functionalist
trend in shaping antitrust jurisprudence, two reasons support a more precise
standard here. First, in the vast majority of cases, a supervisory system that
satisfies the four constant requirements will provide “realistic assurance that a
private party’s anticompetitive [restraint] promotes state policy.” 46 Supreme
40

Id.
Id.
42 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys.,
133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Ticor Title, 504 U.S. 621 (1992); see also Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Remarks to Heritage Foundation: Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental
Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity (Mar. 31, 2015), 2015 WL 1641275, at
*4–5 (discussing additional state-action cases in which the FTC has succeeded).
43 See Ohlhausen, supra note 42, at *7 (“[N.C. Dental] was a fairly broad decision.”). The Clayton
Antitrust Act provides a private cause of action and treble damages for violations of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
44 Foote, supra note 30, at 56 (listing several cases that have been filed “at a rapid clip” in the wake of
N.C. Dental).
45 See supra text accompanying note 35.
46 Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 101 (1988); see also infra Part III.
41
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Court precedent supports this contention. 47 Moreover, the majority’s refusal to
provide a workable standard for the active supervision requirement, just like in
Ticor Title, 48 has created unnecessary uncertainty that is fueling private
regulators’ anxieties. 49
Second, the Parker doctrine reflects the Supreme Court’s view that, under
our federalist system, the federal judiciary should not second-guess, much less
decide, whether a state regulatory board “is . . . structured in a way that merits
a good-government seal of approval.” 50 Similarly, the Parker doctrine is
intended to preclude judicial inquiry into the merits of a state’s regulatory
policy. 51 Hence the tension N.C. Dental poses to the Court’s previously-settled
understanding of the Parker doctrine: An active supervision requirement that
imposes requirements beyond the four constants will invite courts and the
Commission to engage in normative evaluations of state regulatory policies.
This, in turn, is likely to frustrate states’ regulatory regimes.
Although Parker immunity is the best-case scenario for private actors, 52
even when it does not apply and a case proceeds to a trial on the merits, a
member of an active market participant-controlled board should have a better
chance of successfully defending herself than a typical antitrust defendant. To
that end, federal courts should adopt the modified rule of reason proposed by
antitrust scholars Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw. 53 Under this approach,
social-welfare justifications for anticompetitive restraints, which are
traditionally irrelevant in antitrust cases, 54 should apply with special force. 55
This should be especially helpful when the antitrust defendant is a member of a
state medical board.

47

See, e.g., Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (first citing S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United
States, 471 U.S. 48, 51 (1985); then citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1942); and then citing 324
Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1987)).
48 Ticor Title, 504 U.S. at 644 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49 See Foote, supra note 30, at 55 (describing the various state officials still seeking interpretive guidance
on N.C. Dental after the FTC issued its Staff Guidance).
50 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting).
51
Id. (“The question before us is not whether such [state regulatory] programs serve the public
interest.”).
52 Importantly, immunity obviates the need for expensive and time-consuming litigation.
53 Haw & Edlin, supra note 2, at 1100. For an explanation of the modified rule-of-reason approach, see
infra text accompanying notes 237–50.
54 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686 (1978).
55 Haw & Edlin, supra note 2, at 1146.
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Although the modified rule of reason reflects a balanced approach, the
proposal also warrants certain critiques. In particular, Edlin and Haw downplay
a central premise of the Parker doctrine: the federal government should avoid
interfering with states’ core police powers and should resist the temptation to
substitute its judgment for the states’ on matters of state regulatory policy,
even when the efficiency-based goals of the antitrust laws suggest otherwise. 56
Finally, there are other avenues for challenging private delegations that can
address some of the problems posed by self-dealing, government-sanctioned
cartels without infringing on states’ rights as co-equal sovereigns. 57
For the foregoing reasons, this Comment argues that N.C. Dental should
not unduly restrict the state-action antitrust exemption, at least as applied in the
context of state health care regulation. This Comment proceeds in four parts.
Part I discusses the facts of N.C. Dental and evaluates the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part II expands on the FTC’s treatment of the ambiguous
“controlling number” language in the N.C. Dental holding. 58 Part III argues
that the four constant requirements identified by Justice Kennedy should, in
most cases, suffice to satisfy the active supervision requirement. Part IV
considers additional reasons why the Commission and, perhaps more
realistically, the lower courts should interpret N.C. Dental in a way that avoids
dissuading private actors from serving on state boards.
I. THE NARROWED SCOPE OF THE ANTITRUST STATE-ACTION DOCTRINE:
N.C. STATE BOARD OF DENTAL EXAMINERS V. FTC
This Part consists of three sections. Section A provides the factual
background of N.C. Dental. Section B evaluates Justices Kennedy and Alito’s
respective majority and dissenting opinions. Section C explains why states are
likely to respond to N.C. Dental in one of two ways.
A. N.C. Dental—Factual Background
The North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners (the Board) regulated
the practice of dentistry in North Carolina; its membership consisted of six
dentists, one dental hygienist, and one citizen member. 59 North Carolina law
56

Id. at 1131.
Volokh, supra note 2, at 940.
58 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015). This question is critical—N.C. Dental now requires agencies controlled
by active market participants to satisfy the active supervision requirement. Id. at 1116.
59 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-22(b) (2015).
57
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required that North Carolina-licensed dentists elect practicing dentists to serve
on the Board. 60 In 2003, after receiving complaints from dentists about nondentist providers of teeth-whitening services, the Board took action. 61 It sent
“at least 47 cease-and-desist letters to 29 non-dentist teeth-whitening
providers,” alleging that these teeth whiteners were engaged in the
unauthorized practice of dentistry. 62 By 2007, the Board’s campaign had
succeeded: North Carolina was free of the scourge of non-dentist teeth
whiteners. 63
In 2010, the FTC sued the Board for violating the FTC Act. 64 The
Commission viewed the Board’s exclusionary conduct as an anticompetitive
restraint of trade. 65 The Board argued that it did not matter whether its actions
were anticompetitive: as a state agency, the Parker antitrust state-action
exemption shielded its conduct from antitrust scrutiny. 66 The FTC disagreed: it
argued that, because the Board was composed of active market participants,
Parker immunity did not apply unless the Board’s actions were actively
supervised by the state of North Carolina. 67 After the Commission affirmed
two rulings by an administrative law judge denying the Board’s motion to
dismiss on the ground of Parker immunity, the Board appealed to the Fourth
Circuit, which “affirmed the FTC in all respects.” 68
The Fourth Circuit’s holding created a three-way circuit split on the proper
way to distinguish between public and private state agencies for purposes of
state-action antitrust immunity. 69 The split represented a spectrum ranging
from deferential to restrictive in terms of their approaches for classifying
agencies as public. The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals fell
at the most deferential end of the spectrum; these courts followed a “cursory
view [approach] that categorize[d] agencies as public based on minimal
60

N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 365.
62 Id. at 364–65.
63 Id. at 365.
64 Id. The FTC Act is broader, but also includes Section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 873 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court
has held that the FTC’s power to condemn ‘unfair methods of competition’ covers everything that the Sherman
Act covers and goes even further to reach a ‘penumbra’ of practices that are not covered by the Sherman
Act.”).
65 N.C. Dental, 717 F.3d at 365.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 368; see also infra text accompanying note 84.
68 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015).
69 Volokh, supra note 18, at 126.
61
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analysis, sometimes merely relying on the agency’s statutory labeling.” 70 The
First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits followed an “intermediate
view”—these circuits “adopt[ed] more of a laundry-list view that weigh[ed]
various factors cutting for or against publicness.” 71
Finally, the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in North Carolina State
Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, represented the most restrictive view of all
the circuit courts that had confronted this issue. 72 The Fourth Circuit labeled an
agency as public, and thus “found active supervision to be required whenever
the [state] agency [was] composed of private industry participants and . . .
politically accountable only to other private industry participants.” 73 This split
likely influenced the Court’s decision to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
N.C. Dental, a case that one antitrust scholar dubbed, “The Saga of the Dental
Examiners.” 74
B. More Antitrust (Majority) v. More Federalism (Dissent)
The majority opinion, penned by Justice Kennedy, began by noting the
crucial role that antitrust plays in the U.S. economy: “Federal antitrust law is a
central safeguard for the Nation’s free market structures.” 75 The Court
explained that the antitrust laws, by promoting robust competition, inure to the
benefit of the States and their citizenry. 76 However, the majority also
acknowledged that, despite these benefits, “our federalism”—the delicate
balance of powers between the federal government and the several states 77—

70

Id. at 126–27.
Id. The circuit courts that followed this approach would “weigh[] various factors cutting for or against
publicness, such as open records, tax exemption, exercise of governmental functions, lack of possibility of
private profit, and the composition of the entity’s decision-making structure.” Id.
72 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013).
73 Volokh, supra note 18, at 127.
74 Id. at 121.
75 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1109 (2015) (“In this regard it is ‘as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the
protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.’” (quoting United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596,
610 (1972))).
76 Id. “The Sherman Act . . . empowers the States and provides their citizens with opportunities to pursue
their own and the public’s welfare.” Id. (citing FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992)).
77 Federalism is of course the relationship between all branches of the Federal Government and
the state governments. The slogan “our federalism,” however, has become synonymous with
judicial federalism, the notion that federal courts must wield their power with a sensitivity to
its impact on the balance of power between Nation and States.
Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism”, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 703
(1993); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3–28, at 196 (2d ed. 1988)
71
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requires limiting antitrust’s reach. 78 “If every duly enacted state law or policy
were required to conform to the mandates of the Sherman Act . . . federal
antitrust law would impose an impermissible burden on the States’ power to
regulate.” 79 To avoid imposing this impermissible burden, the Parker Court
created an antitrust state-action exemption. 80 This exemption “recognized
Congress’ purpose to respect the federal balance and to ‘embody in the
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a significant
measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.’” 81 Indeed, Parker immunity
helps preserve the states’ rights under our dual system of government to
regulate their internal affairs.
In addressing the merits, Justice Kennedy’s analysis focused on the
distinction between sovereign and nonsovereign actors. The Board had argued
that it was exempt under Parker because “its members were invested by North
Carolina with the power of the State . . . .” 82 The Court thus confronted the
problem that gave rise to the circuit split: whether the Board qualified as public
or private. 83 In holding that a “nonsovereign actor controlled by active market
participants” must satisfy both Midcal requirements (i.e., clear articulation and
active supervision), the majority vindicated the position taken by the FTC at
the Fourth Circuit; whereas the FTC’s approach had focused almost
exclusively on the board’s membership structure. 84 While the political
accountability point emphasized by the Fourth Circuit appeared to factor into
the decision, 85 the holding is broader than the Fourth Circuit’s approach: a
board of gubernatorial-appointee active market participants will need to satisfy
active supervision if they exercise control over a state regulatory board. 86 In
sum, N.C. Dental established that boards controlled by active market

(“[Judicial federalism is] a view that federal courts must regard their power as tempered by a keen appreciation
of the essential role of the states and their judicial systems in our constitutional universe.”).
78 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1109.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1110 (“[T]he Court in Parker v. Brown interpreted the antitrust laws to confer immunity on
anticompetitive conduct by the States when acting in their sovereign capacity.”).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See supra text accompanying note 72.
84 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1110. Under the Commission’s view, “a state regulatory body that is
controlled by participants in the very industry it purports to regulate must satisfy both prongs of Midcal to be
exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine.” Ohlhausen, supra note 42, at *1–2 (quoting
N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, Docket No. 9343, at 13 (F.T.C. Feb. 8, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/cases/2011/02/110208commopinion.pdf).
85 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.
86 Volokh, supra note 29.
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participants are nonsovereign actors. 87 And because these nonsovereign actors
pose unique risks not shared by municipalities, the Court decided that
controlled boards must satisfy the active state supervision requirement to
obtain Parker immunity. 88
Justice Alito’s dissent criticized the majority opinion on three grounds.
First, the dissent argued that the Court’s decision reflected “a serious
misunderstanding of the doctrine of state-action antitrust immunity.” 89
According to the dissent, Parker and its progeny do not invite judicial inquiry
into the risk that a state regulatory agency comprised of private actors will
pursue its members’ financial interests. 90 State regulatory boards had always
been staffed with private actors, 91 and the risk that such boards would engage
in self-dealing was “nothing new.” 92 Moreover, North Carolina’s dental
regulatory scheme appeared analogous to the raisin marketing program upheld
in Parker. 93 Under the dissent’s view, then, the majority erred by focusing on
the Board’s membership structure, as precedent did not dictate that type of
inquiry. 94 Similarly, “whether such [regulatory] programs serve the public
interest” should not have affected the availability of Parker immunity. 95
Instead, the dispositive factor should have been whether North Carolina
labeled the Board a state agency.
Second, and related to the first criticism, Justice Alito argued that the
Court’s decision jeopardized the same federalism principles that motivated the
Parker Court to exempt state action from antitrust scrutiny. 96 Justice Alito
explained that “[t]he Court’s holding in Parker was not based on either the
language of the Sherman Act or anything in the legislative history
affirmatively showing that the Act was not meant to apply to the States.” 97
Rather, the state-action carve-out to the antitrust laws reflected a concern for
87

N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. (“Today . . . the Court takes the unprecedented step of holding that Parker does not apply to the
North Carolina Board because the Board is not structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of
approval . . . . But that is not what Parker immunity is about.”).
91 See supra text accompanying notes 32–33.
92 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1117 (Alito, J., dissenting).
93 Id. (“[T]he very state program involved in [Parker] was unquestionably designed to benefit the
regulated entities, California raisin growers.”).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1122.
97 Id. at 1119.
88
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the States’ right to self-regulation as co-sovereigns under a federalist system. 98
Further, the Parker Court thought it highly unlikely that the drafters of the
Sherman Act intended the law to reach states’ internal regulatory policies. 99
North Carolina’s delegation to its Board of Dental Examiners thus represented
the same “quintessential police power legislation” that had been upheld prior to
and immediately after the Sherman Act’s enactment. 100 Hence, “the North
Carolina statutes establishing and specifying the powers of the [Board]
represent precisely the kind of state regulation that the Parker exemption was
meant to immunize.” 101
Third, in addition to criticizing the majority for incorrectly applying
precedent and infringing on states’ rights, 102 the dissent cautioned that the
Court’s decision would “create practical problems and [was] likely to have farreaching effects on the States’ regulation of professions.” 103 In particular, the
dissent queried whether states would have trouble deciphering the majority
opinion. The dissent specifically identified three ambiguities in the holding:
(1) what constitutes “a controlling number [of active market participants]”;
(2) who qualifies as an “active market participant”; and (3) “[w]hat is the scope
of the market in which a member may not participate while serving on the
board?” 104 The dissent also pointed out the difficulty of identifying when
regulatory capture has occurred. 105 As this litany of pointed questions makes
clear, the holding raised numerous questions that were far from selfexplanatory.
C. Two Responses: Either Avoid Active Market Participant Control, or
Actively Supervise
Assuming states value the protections afforded by Parker immunity, which
is a fair assumption, 106 they will likely respond to N.C. Dental in one of two

98

Id. at 1119.
Id. (“For the Congress that enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, it would have been a truly radical and
almost certainly futile step to attempt to prevent the States from exercising their traditional regulatory
authority, and the Parker Court refused to assume that the Act was meant to have such an effect.”).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1123.
103 Id. at 1122.
104 Id. at 1123.
105 Id. at 1118.
106 Twenty-two states signed on to an amicus brief that expressed the concern that affirming the FTC
would severely disrupt their regulatory regimes. See Brief for State of West Virginia and 22 Other States as
99
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ways: (1) restructure their boards to avoid active market participant control, or
(2) provide active state supervision.
Presumably, the footnote in Town of Hallie still applies, and agencies not
controlled by active market participants remain sufficiently public such that
they only need to satisfy Midcal’s clear articulation requirement. 107 As such,
some states might decide to avoid the uncertainty of a flexible and contextdependent active supervision inquiry by reorganizing their state boards to
avoid active market participant control altogether. One way to accomplish this
would involve disempowering active market participants such that they would
only provide advisory opinions to state boards composed of elected officials.
Yet, this option has potentially significant drawbacks. If states reconstitute
their boards such that active market participants only provide advisory
opinions, a primary advantage of delegating discretionary authority to
professionals is lost: cost savings. Indeed, professionals serving on state
medical boards are usually part-time employees that do not receive a salary
from the state. 108 Although the federal government has the financial ability to
staff its regulatory agencies with full-time experts, financially-constrained state
governments often rely on part-time, unpaid professionals to serve on state
regulatory boards. 109This consideration should not be overlooked.
Alternatively, states could ensure that boards controlled by active market
participants are subject to their active supervision. Several states, such as
Florida and Tennessee, staff their regulatory boards with a majority of active
market participants. 110 Rather than reorganizing their regulatory boards to
avoid active market participant control, these states might opt for providing
active supervision. As Justice Kennedy pointed out in his majority opinion:
“States . . . can ensure Parker immunity is available to agencies by adopting
clear policies to displace competition; and, if agencies controlled by active
market participants interpret or enforce those policies, the States may provide
active supervision.” 111

Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No.
13–534).
107 See supra text accompanying notes 20–21.
108 Counsel representing the Board expressed this concern at oral argument. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 4, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13–534) (“States obtain
valuable benefits from using market participants as part-time public officials. They gain the benefits of their
expertise and they gain the benefits of not having to have a full-time bureaucracy with a full salary.”).
109 Id.
110 Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1103.
111 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1115.
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The remainder of this Comment attempts to resolve some of the
ambiguities in the holding and, in so doing, argues for an interpretation and
application of N.C. Dental that preserves states’ regulatory flexibility within
the delicate balance of “our federalism.” 112
II. CONTROLLING INFLUENCES: IDENTIFYING AND AVOIDING ACTIVE MARKET
PARTICIPANT CONTROL
This Part considers one of the central questions raised by N.C. Dental: what
constitutes a “controlling number” of active market participants? 113 Section A
explains why this issue needs clarification. Section B discusses the FTC Staff
Guidance Statement’s definition of “active market participant” and considers
the factors identified by the FTC as indicative of control. Section C considers
how states can avoid active market participant control of their regulatory
boards.
A. Is a Controlling Number Equivalent to a Majority?
The majority opinion in N.C. Dental held that active state supervision is
necessary to invoke Parker immunity when a “controlling number of decision
makers [on a state board] are active market participants in the occupation the
board regulates.” 114 Because it referred to a “controlling number” of decision
makers, the holding creates the possibility that a state regulatory board with
less than a majority of interested decision makers would need to demonstrate
active state supervision to obtain Parker immunity. 115 Notably, the opinion did
not provide a test for identifying those situations where a non-majority,
“controlling” influence exists.
A currently pending case involving an antitrust challenge to a taxicab
authority illustrates the need to clarify this aspect of the holding. In Wallen v.
St. Louis Metropolitan Taxicab Commission, 116 a group of independent drivers
brought suit against a taxicab commission and its members for “engag[ing] in
anti-competitive conduct stifling competition in the vehicle for hire and taxicab

112
113
114
115
116

2015).

See supra note 77.
N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
Id.
Id.
Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n, No. 15-1432, 2015 WL 5561844 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 18,
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industry.” 117 The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that active market participants
controlled the taxicab commission. 118 Because the state had not actively
supervised the commission, plaintiffs argued that the commission was not
entitled to Parker immunity under the N.C. Dental holding. 119
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argued that they were not required to
satisfy the active supervision requirement: “since only four of the nine . . .
Commissioners are members of the taxicab industry, a controlling number of
Defendant MTC’s decision makers are not active market participants and [thus
the active supervision requirement] . . . does not apply.” 120 In other words, the
defendant taxicab commission argued that a non-majority of active market
participants could not constitute a controlling number.
The defendants’ interpretation of N.C. Dental is likely erroneous: Justice
Kennedy deliberately used the phrase “controlling number” instead of
majority. At the very least, this case evinces the need for guidance on this
ambiguity in the N.C. Dental holding. 121 The FTC Staff Guidance Statement
provides a useful starting point for interpreting the holding.
B. FTC Staff Guidance Statement: Defining “Active Market Participant” &
Indicia of Control
The FTC Staff Guidance Statement defines “active market participant” and
provides factors for states to consider when assessing whether active market
participants control their regulatory boards. 122 Because boards controlled by
active market participants must satisfy Midcal’s active state supervision
requirement, it is important to define “active market participant” and to delimit
the scope of the relevant market. The FTC’s statement indicates that active
market participant includes any person that either is licensed by the board “in
the occupation [it] regulates” or, alternatively, “provides any service that is
subject to the regulatory authority of the board.” 123 Notably, for the purpose of

117 Brief for Defendant at 1, Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2015) (No.
15-1432), 2015 WL 9942788.
118 Complaint at 3, Wallen v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n (E.D. Mo. Sept. 18, 2015) (No. 15-1432),
2015 WL 9687122.
119 Id. at 7.
120 Brief for Defendant at 9, Wallen, v. St. Louis Metro. Taxicab Comm’n (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2015) (No.
15-1432), 2015 WL 9942788.
121 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
122 STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 7–8.
123 Id. at 7.
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identifying whether a private actor serving on a state board qualifies as an
active market participant, the Staff Guidance Statement explicitly rejects
according any weight to the method by which that person was selected to serve
on the board. 124
The Guidance also provided a list of five factors the Commission would
consider when assessing active market participant control of a board. The first
two factors concerned “[t]he structure of the . . . board . . . and the rules
governing the exercise of the board’s authority” and “[w]hether the board
members who are active market participants have veto power over the board’s
regulatory decisions.” 125 Third and fourth, the Commission indicated that it
would consider the non-market participant’s influence and exercise of control
over the board, especially in relation to the active market participants. 126 Fifth,
“[w]hether the active market participants . . . exercised, controlled, or usurped
the decisionmaking power of the board” would factor into the Commission’s
calculus. 127 The first two factors indicate formal control and are amenable to ex
ante evaluation; these are straightforward inquiries. However, factors three
through five would reveal de facto control and, consequently, must be
evaluated retrospectively.
A hypothetical variation on the facts of N.C. Dental illustrates the
interaction of these factors. Suppose that the Dental Examiners Board had
consisted of three practicing dentists, three practicing dental hygienists, and
two citizens appointed by the governor to represent the general public. In
assessing whether the active market participants control the board, the initial
step would involve identifying the nature of the restraint. Assuming the
restraint was anticompetitive in some respect, a court would first consider the
board’s membership structure. Here, the practicing dentists do not constitute a
majority. 128 Nonetheless, they might exercise implicit or de facto control over
the board. 129 Evidence of such control could take a variety of forms. 130

124

Id.
Id. at 8.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 This Comment assumes a court would find a board controlled by active market participants if a
majority of its members were practicing dentists.
129 An analogous situation occurs in corporate law when courts consider whether a non-majority
shareholder exercises control over a board of directors. See infra note 134.
130 Moreover, whether a particular type of evidence qualified as relevant would depend on the unique
facts of the case, such as the nature of the alleged antitrust violation or the power allocated or otherwise
exercised by the active market participants.
125
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For instance, the rigor with which the board members reviewed public
comments and objections or otherwise debated the merits of the regulation
prior to its approval would provide relevant evidence of the board members’
independence. 131 This relates to factors three through five, 132 which can all be
assessed by looking to the administrative record compiled by the agency in
promulgating the restraint. If the record revealed the non-dentist members had
engaged in a searching inquiry prior to approving, such as by requiring the
dentist members to respond to claims that teeth-whitening services pose
minimal health risks, that would suggest the dentists did not exert control over
the board. 133 Conversely, if the record indicated that the non-dentist board
members acquiesced to the dentists’ views, or otherwise failed to have the
dentists defend the rule against negative public comments and objections, that
would suggest the dentists exercised control over the board. 134 Indeed, a lack
of debate on a policy to exclude non-dentist teeth-whitening services suggests
acquiescence or, at the very least, deference to the demands of the board’s
dentists. In such a situation, the dentists likely exercise de facto control over
the board. However, it would be prudent to analyze a pattern of decisionmaking to address the possibility that the non-dentists are actually independent
and simply sided with the dentists because they agreed with them on a
particular issue. This, too, could explain the lack of debate in the preceding
example.
Another relevant inquiry would involve examining the professional and
financial interdependence of dentists and hygienists. Even if those hygienists
were not directly employed by practicing dentists, there is undoubtedly a
symbiotic relationship between hygienists and dentists. This relationship could
lead the board’s dentists and hygienists to adopt a quid pro quo strategy when
considering exclusionary regulations to impose on the dental industry. 135 Such
131

STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 8.
See supra text accompanying notes 125–26.
133 See STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 8–9.
134 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994). In Kahn, though a
stockholder owned 43.3% of the voting shares, the court did not identify him as a controlling stockholder on
that basis. Id. at 1113–14. Rather, it looked to the relationship between the board of directors and the
stockholder during the course of the transaction negotiations. Id. at 1114–15. The evidence indicated that the
stockholder threatened a tender offer at its price, which the committee reluctantly accepted. Id. at 1118–19.
Despite the independent committee’s hard bargaining, it eventually acquiesced to the stockholder’s offering
price. Id. This indicated that the stockholder had control and, consequently, that the committee did not operate
independently of the controller’s influence. See id. at 1120–21.
135 See The Supreme Court 2014 Term—Leading Cases: Sherman Act—State-Action Immunity—North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 129 HARV. L. REV. 371, 379 (Nov. 2015) (“An ideal
approach [to requiring active supervision of controlled boards] would require state supervision . . . where there
132
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significant financial interdependence strongly suggests implicit control,
making active supervision necessary. 136 Indeed, although the five factors listed
in the Staff Guidance Statement do not cover this scenario, the Commission
would almost certainly view the active market participants as having control
over the board given such financial interdependence.
C. Avoiding Active Market Participant Control
State legislatures can ensure their state agencies are not controlled by active
market participant members in at least two ways. First, states could
disempower private actors from serving on boards that regulate fields in which
the actors have a personal interest. If such members were permitted to issue
only advisory opinions or lacked voting rights, and state officials were required
to approve all opinions proposed by the active market participants, supervision
would be unnecessary. 137 Because the private actors would lack
decisionmaking authority, and the decision would necessarily come from the
state itself, immunity would attach without the need to satisfy active
supervision—a state agency would only need to satisfy the clear articulation
requirement. 138 Although this option might reduce uncertainty, it also risks
curtailing expert input in agency decisionmaking or, alternatively, increasing
costs if states find it necessary to create additional government positions for
expert officials. 139
Another option is for state legislatures to mandate that the majority of a
state agency’s membership consists of consumer advocates, economists, or
other persons that lack a direct financial interest in the industry over which the
board exercises regulatory authority. 140 For the reasons discussed above,
however, following this option would not guarantee that Parker could be
invoked in all situations. For example, if a court were to find that the consumer
representatives had not vigorously debated a proposed regulation to ban nondentists from providing teeth-whitening services, then a court could easily find
that the active market participants controlled the board, at least with respect to
that restraint. 141 Similarly, if the board did not consider proposals that
is a risk of ‘back-scratching’—but would not call for supervision of boards that are unmotivated by private
gain.”).
136 The active supervision requirement is discussed infra Part III.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 14–16.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 14–16.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 107–08.
140 See STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 1.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 107–08.
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represented less restrictive alternatives to the restraint the board promulgated,
that would provide evidence of active market participant control. 142 In both
cases, even if the completely disinterested members of the board outnumbered
the active market participants two-to-one, active supervision is necessary. The
ambiguity in this approach, which stems from the lack of a definite standard
for making the controlling-number determination, presents more risk to state
legislatures as they attempt to navigate the post-N.C. Dental legal landscape.
Considered in this light, states will likely want to provide for active
supervision, particularly over agencies such as state medical boards and bar
associations. The advisory opinion option would require states to enact laws
for every proposed regulation and would limit the discretionary authority of
such boards. 143 This is particularly troublesome in the context of medical
regulation, where the quantity and complexity of regulations arguably
necessitates delegating discretionary regulatory authority to private actors in
the first place. Although active supervision would require the state to supervise
such boards’ conduct on the merits, the majority declared that adequate state
“supervision need not entail day-to-day . . . micromanagement” of state
agencies’ operations. 144 This approach raises a corollary question: how can a
state ensure that it adequately supervises its active market participantcontrolled boards?
III. ACTIVE STATE SUPERVISION: THE FOUR CONSTANTS SHOULD SUFFICE
This Part argues that federal courts and the FTC should regard a state
supervisory system that meets the four constant requirements, identified by the
majority in N.C. Dental, as presumptively adequate for purposes of Parker
immunity. 145 Section A surveys the cases that developed the active supervision
requirement within the Parker doctrine, and these cases constitute persuasive
authority for the proposed presumption. Section B considers the policy
justifications, grounded in federalism principles, for maintaining limits on the
active supervision inquiry.

142

See infra text accompanying notes 256–58.
See supra text accompanying notes 107–08.
144 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015). Importantly, assuming they
do not restrict market entry, prices, or product output, many of the regulations passed by these boards are
unlikely to raise antitrust concerns. Thus, state legislatures can avoid neutering their professional boards and
maintain these boards’ discretionary authority, and in the most sensitive areas provide active supervision to
immunize them.
145 Supra text accompanying note 35.
143
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A. Active State Supervision—Supreme Court Pedigree
This section first discusses the pre-Midcal cases that shaped the Court’s
understanding of the active supervision requirement. Next, it considers the
post-Midcal cases that further developed the contours of the active supervision
requirement. These cases confirm that the four constant requirements have
sufficed for providing adequate state supervision in the Court’s antitrust stateaction cases. Moreover, these cases reveal that, throughout Parker’s doctrinal
history, the Court has regarded the active supervision inquiry as a limited one
that seeks to ensure that the state—not the federal government—has
substantively reviewed challenged anticompetitive programs. What’s more, the
Court has consistently cautioned against the federal government imposing its
policy preferences on states that have deliberately implemented occupational
licensing and other regulatory regimes.
1. Midcal’s Predecessors
Even before Midcal formally established the active state supervision
requirement, 146 the Court had considered state supervision a relevant factor in
its antitrust state-action cases. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme
Court considered a challenge to a minimum-fee schedule published by a
county bar association and enforced by the State Bar. 147 Plaintiffs were a class
of individuals who had unsuccessfully sought to retain lawyers willing to
perform title examinations at less than the minimum fee prescribed in the
schedule. 148 They alleged that both the fee schedule and its enforcement by the
State Bar violated the Sherman Act’s prohibition on price-fixing. 149 The
Virginia State Bar argued it was exempt from antitrust scrutiny under
Parker. 150
The Court sided with the plaintiffs. Chief Justice Burger explained that the
nominal labeling of an entity as a state agency does not automatically
transform it into a sovereign actor entitled to Parker immunity. 151 Instead, the
146

See supra text accompanying note 17.
421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
148 Id. at 775–76.
149 Id. at 778; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 359 (1977) (“The schedule and its
enforcement mechanism operated to create a rigid price floor for services and thus constituted a classic
example of price fixing.”).
150 Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 779.
151 Id. at 791 (“The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not create an
antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members.”).
147
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central inquiry was whether the State itself compelled or required the
anticompetitive activities. 152 Although the Court had not yet established the
two-part Midcal test and would later relax the compulsion requirement, it
considered the lack of direct supervision by the Virginia Supreme Court
pertinent to its decision denying immunity. 153
In another pre-Midcal case two years later, the Court again considered
active supervision relevant to its antitrust state-action analysis. In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 154 a pair of lawyers alleged that the Arizona State Bar’s rules
on legal advertising, which prohibited lawyers in that state from advertising on
price, constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade. 155 Like the Virginia State
Bar in Goldfarb, the Arizona State Bar argued it was exempt from the Sherman
Act under the Parker doctrine. 156
Although the Court found that the Bar’s rules infringed the plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights, it found the Arizona Bar immune. 157 Central to the Court’s
holding was that the “rules [were] subject to pointed re-examination by the
policymaker—the Arizona Supreme Court.” 158 Because Arizona’s Supreme
Court embodied the sovereign government, its supervision effectively
transformed the private actors’ conduct into the conduct of the state.
Goldfarb and Bates each recognized the importance of active supervision
when states delegate regulatory authority to active market participants. In fact,
active state supervision accounts for the diverging holdings in each case: the
Virginia Supreme Court’s passive role in enacting and monitoring the
minimum fee schedule contrasted sharply with the Arizona Supreme Court’s
“pointed re–examination” of the lawyer advertising rules. 159 Although neither
case provided significant guidance on the dictates of the active supervision
requirement, antitrust scholars Areeda and Hovenkamp observe that, “[o]nce it
was clear that authorized Arizona authorities [i.e. the State’s Supreme Court]
clearly intended to prevent lawyer advertising, the Bates Court did not make a
strict assessment for Sherman Act purposes of whether the blanket state ban
152

Id.
“[The Court] considered the lack of supervision by the Virginia Supreme Court to be a principal reason
for denying immunity.” N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (citing
Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 791).
154 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
155 Id. at 353, 356.
156 Id. at 357.
157 Id. at 363.
158 Id. at 361–62.
159 Id. at 362.
153
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was truly necessary for the achievement of proper state purposes.” 160 The
Court acknowledged this principle—that the federal courts should refrain from
evaluating the substantive merits of the states’ regulatory policies in Parker
cases—in its subsequent state-action cases.
2. Midcal and Its Progeny
Nearly forty years after Parker, the Supreme Court decided California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 161 Midcal distilled from
the Parker line of cases a two-pronged test for nonsovereign actors to obtain
Parker immunity: (1) “the challenged restraints must be ‘one clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy’;” and (2) “the policy
must be ‘actively supervised’ by the State itself.” 162
The Midcal Court considered whether “California’s plan for wine pricing
violate[d] the Sherman Act.” 163 The program at issue allowed wine producers
“to prevent price competition by dictating the prices charged by
wholesalers.” 164 The Court explained that the producers could only escape
Sherman Act liability if antitrust immunity attached to their conduct. 165
Because the producers were nonsovereign, private actors, the Court predicated
Parker immunity on satisfaction of the two above conditions. Although the
wine pricing system satisfied the first prong, it failed the second. 166
The Court found California’s passive role in supervising the wine pricing
system inadequate to constitute active supervision. “The State simply
authorize[d] price setting and enforce[d] the prices established by private
parties,” and “neither establishe[d] prices nor review[ed] the reasonableness of
the price schedules.” 167 The Court distinguished California’s passive role in
supervising the regulatory program in Midcal from the facts of Parker, where
160 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 221d, at 372 (2d ed. 2006).
161 445 U.S. 97, 104 (1980).
162 Id. at 105 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)); see also
supra text accompanying note 17.
163 Id. at 102.
164 Id. at 103.
165 Id. at 102–03.
166 Id. at 105 (“The legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price
maintenance.”).
167 Id. In addition, the Court also cited two additional factors that led it to conclude that the state did not
actively supervise the program: the state did not “regulate the terms of fair trade contracts” and also “[did] not
monitor market conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program.” Id. at 105–06.
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the state took an active role in supervising the raisin marketing program. 168
Because California had not adequately supervised the program, the Parker
antitrust exemption did not attach to the agency’s conduct, thus subjecting the
program to antitrust scrutiny. 169 In a pointed reminder of antitrust’s supremacy
as federal law, the Court declared: “[t]he national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.” 170
After Midcal, a series of cases developed the contours of the active
supervision requirement and, more generally, the principles underlying the
Parker doctrine. The first case to apply the Midcal two-pronged test, Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 171 involved a suit by
the United States to enjoin the collective ratemaking activities of “[two] ‘rate
bureaus’ composed of motor common carriers operating in four Southeastern
States.” 172 The bureaus would set common carrier rates for intrastate
transportation of commodities by having a bureau committee submit a
collective proposal to a State Public Service Commission. 173 The petitionerrate bureaus justified this practice by stating that the joint proposals
“permit[ed] the [Public Service Commissions] to consider more carefully each
submission.” 174 The Government argued that this practice violated the
Sherman Act’s prohibition on conspiratorial price-fixing. 175
The central issue in Southern Motor Carriers was whether the state needed
to compel the ratemaking activities for Parker immunity to shield the bureaus
from the Sherman Act. 176 In holding that “there [was] no inflexible
‘compulsion requirement,’” 177 Justice Powell’s opinion acknowledged the
practical necessity of extending Parker immunity to private parties. 178 The

168

Id. at 105.
Id.
170 Id. at 106.
171 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
172 Id. at 50.
173 Id. at 52. The Court pointed out, however, that the “[m]embers of the bureau [were] not bound by the
joint proposal,” and that “[a]ny disapproving member [could] submit an independent rate proposal to the state
regulatory Commission.” Id.
174 Id. at 51.
175 Id. at 53.
176 Id. at 50.
177 Id. at 62.
178 Id. at 61; see also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (“If the Federal Government or a private
litigant always could enforce the Sherman Act against private parties, then a State could not effectively
implement a program restraining competition among them.”).
169
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decision thus reflected an appreciation for the flexibility that states need to
formulate regulatory policies.
Interestingly, the Court later cited this case for the proposition that active
supervision requires a state official to “have and exercise ultimate authority”
over the challenged anticompetitive conduct of private actors. 179 Although the
opinion mentioned this language, the Government in Southern Motor Carriers
conceded that the state Public Service Commissions exercised supervision over
the rate bureaus’ rate-setting mechanisms. 180 Thus, the active supervision issue
was not even litigated, and the Court only considered whether the clear
articulation requirement could be satisfied in the absence of compulsion.
Nevertheless, the case exemplifies the federalism principles that animate the
state-action doctrine.
Although the Supreme Court explicitly held that active supervision was
unnecessary in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 181 a brief description of
the case is useful for clarifying the relationship between Parker, Midcal, and
N.C. Dental. In Town of Hallie, the Court considered the placement of
municipalities within the Parker scheme. 182 The case involved several
Wisconsin towns’ allegations of anticompetitive conduct by the city of Eau
Claire. 183 The city refused to allow the Wisconsin towns to use its sewage
treatment plant; it did, however, offer landowners use of the plant on the
condition that they agree “to have their homes annexed by the city and to use
the city’s sewage collection and transportation services.” 184 Because the towns
already had their own collection and transportation services, they alleged that
the city’s conduct constituted illegal tying. 185
The Supreme Court held that the city only needed to satisfy the first prong
(i.e., clear articulation) to invoke Parker immunity. 186 The Court explained
that the public nature of the municipalities obviated the need for active state
supervision. 187 And “because various Wisconsin statutes clearly contemplated

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

S. Motor, 471 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 62.
471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985).
Volokh, supra note 18, at 124.
Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 36.
Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.
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that cities could engage in anticompetitive conduct,” 188 the clear articulation
prong was satisfied. Hence, the city was immune from antitrust liability.
In 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 189 the Court considered a challenge to the
New York liquor-pricing statutory scheme. The statutes and regulations
combined to “permit [liquor] wholesalers to maintain retail [liquor] prices at
artificially high levels.” 190 After the plaintiff, a liquor corporation, had its
license suspended and received a fine for selling liquor at a price that violated
the statute, it sought to invalidate the law on the grounds that it violated the
Sherman Act. 191 Reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court found the statutory scheme did not qualify for Parker immunity because
the state failed to adequately supervise its implementation. 192 Justice Powell’s
opinion squarely confronted the active supervision requirement. Like in
Midcal, the dispositive factor in this case concerned the state’s inadequate
supervision over its anticompetitive policy. 193 Because the state’s review
mechanisms failed to “exert[] any significant control over” the restraints
imposed by private parties via the statutes, 194 the goal of active supervision—
to ensure that the challenged conduct reflected state policy—was not met.
One year after 324 Liquor Corp., the Court provided its most detailed
treatment of the requirements for adequate state supervision in Patrick v.
Burget. 195 In Patrick, the Court considered whether Parker immunity shielded
a group of Oregon physicians that had served on a peer-review committee. The
plaintiff-physician sued the committee after it threatened to terminate his
hospital privileges. 196 Because the committee was composed of private actors,
active state supervision was necessary for the committee members to avail
themselves of the state-action exemption. 197 The Court held Oregon’s

188 Sasha Volokh, Will the Supreme Court Hear this Important Antitrust Case?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/01/27/willthe-supreme-court-hear-this-important-antitrust-case/?utm_term=.75b56b441347; see also Volokh, supra note
18, at 125 (“If Eau Claire had been a private corporation, [the city’s] conduct might have been illegal
tying . . . .”).
189 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
190 Id. at 340.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 344 (“New York’s liquor pricing system is not actively supervised by the State.”).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 335 n.7.
195 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
196 Id. at 97–98. The plaintiff alleged that the committee’s decision was motivated by a desire “to reduce
competition from [plaintiff] rather than to improve patient care.” Id.
197 Id. at 96, 100.
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supervision inadequate because state law only authorized the supervising
entities to review whether the committee followed the proper procedures in
excluding the plaintiff-physician under the peer-review system. 198 As the Court
explained, active supervision requires the state to review the committee’s
decisions on the merits. 199
Again in Patrick, the Court deemed a supervisory system inadequate
because it failed to satisfy the constant requirements identified in N.C. Dental;
tellingly, no additional factors beyond the four constant requirements were
cited. 200 Patrick thus supports the proposition that, in the context of Parker
immunity, a supervisory system’s adequacy should stand or fall based on
whether it satisfies the four constant requirements. 201 “Absent such a program
of supervision, there is no realistic assurance that a private party’s
anticompetitive conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s
individual interests.” 202 Because the supervising entities did not engage in any
substantive review of the committee’s decision to terminate the physicianplaintiff, the state’s supervision was insufficient to confer Parker immunity. 203
Importantly, although the Court made clear that adequate state supervision
requires state officials to conduct a substantive review on the merits, it
reiterated that federal courts should refrain from conducting their own merits
analysis or passing judgment on states’ regulatory policies. 204
Prior to N.C. Dental, the Supreme Court had last addressed the active state
supervision requirement in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance. 205 In Ticor Title, the
Court considered whether the Third Circuit correctly held that title insurance
companies, which the FTC determined had engaged in horizontal price fixing
in Connecticut, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Montana, were entitled to Parker
immunity. 206 In holding that the regulatory schemes in Wisconsin and Montana
were not exempt under Parker, the Court reinforced its holding in Patrick that

198

Id. at 102–06.
Id. at 105; see also 324 Liquor Corp., 479 U.S. at 344–46 (holding New York’s supervision of its
liquor-pricing system inadequate for conferring Parker immunity because the state failed to “monitor market
conditions or engage in any ‘pointed reexamination’ of the program” (citations omitted)).
200 Patrick, 486 U.S. at 102–05.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 101.
203 Id. at 105 (“Such constricted review does not convert the action of a private party . . . into the action of
the State for purposes of the state-action doctrine.”).
204 Id.
205 504 U.S. 621 (1992).
206 Id. at 632.
199
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satisfying Midcal’s active supervision prong requires more than the “mere
potential for state supervision.” 207
In Ticor Title, the Court considered whether negative option approval
mechanisms could suffice for active supervision. 208 Although the Court did not
rule that such mechanisms were necessarily insufficient, it agreed with the
FTC that, notwithstanding the potential for adequate active supervision, it
occurred in neither Wisconsin nor Montana. 209 The state agencies charged with
reviewing the rate filings did not conduct any analysis of the rates to ensure
their reasonableness or how they compared with other states. 210 Instead, the
agencies merely verified the filing for mathematical accuracy and, even when
Montana would request, but fail to receive, additional information from the
rating bureaus concerning the filings, the rates “remained in effect.” 211 Finally,
“the state agencies’ limited role and participation . . . likewise limited” the
prospect of judicial review and, therefore, the review could not save an
otherwise deficient state supervisory system. 212 Taken together, these factors
compelled the Court’s conclusion that “no active supervision” occurred in
Wisconsin and Montana. 213
The preceding survey reveals that the four constant requirements have
always been sufficient to satisfy the active supervision requirement. 214 The
Court has emphasized in all of its state-action cases that, under our federalist
system, states are entitled to a significant amount of respect, especially in the
realm of professional regulation. 215 Importantly, this proposed presumption,
which would help narrow the broad scope of N.C. Dental, is bolstered by not
only precedent, but also weighty policy considerations.

207 Id. at 638 (“The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a decision by the
State. Under these standards, we must conclude that there was no active supervision in either Wisconsin or
Montana.”); see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 (“The mere presence of some state involvement or monitoring
does not suffice [for satisfying the active supervision requirement].”).
208 These mechanisms permitted title insurance companies to file rates with the state and, unless the state
disapproved within thirty days, the rate would become effective. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 629.
209 Id. at 638.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 638–39; see also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 103–05.
213 Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638.
214 Actually, the court in N.C. Dental added the requirement that a disinterested government official
approve the challenged decision. 135 S. Ct. at 1116–17. Thus, prior to N.C. Dental some permutation of the
other three requirements sufficed for adequate supervision. See id.
215 See supra Part III.A.
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B. Policy Justifications—The Four Constants Should Suffice
This section provides additional arguments and policy considerations that
strongly favor a presumption of adequate state supervision when a state
supervisory system meets the four constant requirements. First, this
presumption would avoid the risk that the FTC or federal courts interpret and
apply N.C. Dental too broadly; this, in turn, would help alleviate the concern
that professionals respond to the decision by refusing to serve on state
boards. 216 Second, the ability to delegate discretionary regulatory authority is
critical to the efficacy of state regulatory policies in technical fields and
professions. 217 Finally, although the Court has expanded the reach of the
antitrust laws in recent years, federal courts should not permit plaintiffs or the
government to use the Sherman Act as a workaround for protecting economic
rights under the guise of substantive due process. Given the availability of
other avenues for challenging unduly burdensome economic regulations, this
argument is particularly persuasive.
1. Limiting the FTC and Federal Courts’ Discretion
N.C. Dental is replete with ambiguities. 218 Because the Court provided
minimal guidance on how to interpret the “controlling number of active market
participants” phrase and, perhaps more problematically, implied that the active
state supervision requirement is amorphous, 219 the lower courts and the
Commission have wide discretion in interpreting the decision. There are at
least two reasons why this would be disconcerting to the professional
regulators upon whom the states rely to effectuate their occupational regulatory
policies.
First, the Commission will likely interpret N.C. Dental as broadly as
possible. 220 The staff of the FTC’s Competition Bureau is paid to enforce the
Sherman Act and, more generally, competition policy. 221 Moreover, the
216

Here, it is critical that immunity helps these private regulators avoid suit altogether.
Limiting the active supervision requirement would avoid the risk that states must create new
bureaucracies to satisfy Midcal’s second prong. See Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
218 For instance: (1) who qualifies as an active market participant; (2) how wide is the scope of the market
for active market participants; and (3) what is a controlled board? N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1122 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
219 N.C. Dental, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.
220 STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 9–10.
221 About the Bureau of Competition, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureaucompetition/about-bureau-competition (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
217
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Commission does not operate under the guise of federalism principles and, for
at least the past thirty years, has demonstrated a commitment to reining in the
state-action doctrine. As such, who could blame professional regulators for
viewing skeptically the FTC’s statement that it would apply the N.C. Dental
decision “reasonably and flexibly?” 222
In addition to the FTC’s role as an aggressive enforcer of the competition
laws, another reason why N.C. Dental worries professional regulators is that
private antitrust litigants may obtain treble damages for successful suits against
state boards. 223 Thus, although Article III judges may be more inclined to
respect federalism principles and exercise restraint in interpreting N.C. Dental
than the competition watchdogs at the FTC, private suits in federal courts pose
a greater threat of significant antitrust liability.
To help reduce uncertainty surrounding the decision, the lower courts
should establish a presumption that a state supervisory system is sufficient
when it meets the four constant requirements discussed above. By limiting the
broad scope of N.C. Dental, this presumption could encourage private
regulators to serve on state boards in the aftermath of N.C. Dental.
2. Discretionary Regulatory Authority: Necessary in Certain Professions
The Court recognized in Southern Motor Carriers that a compulsion
requirement impinges too far on states’ regulatory flexibility. 224 An expansive
interpretation of the active supervision requirements presents comparable risk.
States delegate regulatory authority to nonsovereign, private actors in the
medical and legal professions so that individuals with relevant expertise can
bring their experience to bear in designing regulatory policies. 225 These
persons need a significant amount of discretion to exercise their duties. If they
lack discretionary authority, or if a burdensome active supervision requirement
forces boards to submit and receive formal state approval for each and every
regulation they proposed, the efficiency gains from these types of delegations
will no longer be realized. More generally, if states are not able to reassure
professionals that active supervision is satisfied and, accordingly, that Parker
222

STAFF GUIDANCE, supra note 39, at 10.
15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2016).
224 S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985) (“The Parker doctrine
represents an attempt to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goal of the
antitrust laws . . . . A compulsion requirement is inconsistent with both values. It reduces the range of
regulatory alternatives available to the State.”).
225 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1122 (2015) (Alito. J., dissenting).
223
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immunity will protect them, it seems dubious that these persons will continue
to devote their time to serving on state boards.
3. Checks and Balances
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Framers of the Constitution
envisioned a system of checks and balances; central to a government operating
under this ideal is that the states retain the authority to which they are
entitled. 226 Permitting the FTC or private plaintiffs to unduly interfere with a
state’s core police powers would denigrate the federalist structure guaranteed
by the Constitution and affirmed by the Tenth Amendment. 227 Indeed, a state’s
right to regulate its internal economic affairs is at the core of its police powers,
and permitting federal government interference with the exercise of these
powers “would turn federalism on its head.” 228 Although the problems caused
by excessive occupational licensing requirements offend fundamental notions
of economic liberty and free markets, antitrust federalism should not be
abandoned wholesale when it occasionally, or even frequently, facilitates bad
results.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
This Part provides additional support for why N.C. Dental need not, or at
least should not, dissuade private actors from serving on state boards.
Section A evaluates a recently proposed “modified rule of reason” analysis for
antitrust cases involving regulatory boards. 229 This approach should make a
trial on the merits more favorable for certain private-regulator antitrust
defendants; in particular, the modified rule of reason should work to the benefit
of medical professionals whose challenged conduct involves health care
regulation. Section B discusses the other options for challenging privateregulatory delegations—the availability of these alternatives provides further
support for maintaining the Parker doctrine’s vitality, at least in areas where
states most need to rely on delegations of discretionary regulatory authority.

226

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
228 Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015)
(No. 13–534).
229 Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1100.
227
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A. Trial on the Merits and a Modified Rule of Reason
Although state agencies and their members would prefer not facing a suit in
the first place, failing to satisfy the Midcal requirement does not mean an
antitrust violation has occurred. Instead, when a court finds that Parker
immunity does not apply, the case then proceeds to trial. To meet its initial
burden and survive summary judgment, the party challenging a regulatory
board’s conduct—whether the government or a private plaintiff—must provide
sufficient evidence to establish certain basic elements supporting its claim that
the defendant has unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the antitrust
laws. 230 Such elements include showing that the defendant’s conduct had a
substantial anticompetitive effect in a relevant market; that any incidental
restraints caused by the defendant are not outweighed by procompetitive
justifications; or that the defendant engaged in concerted exclusionary
conduct. 231
Once a case makes it past motions for summary judgment, the standard of
review becomes relevant. The presumptive and preferred standard of review in
antitrust cases is the rule of reason, 232 especially when challenged conduct
involves rules and regulations promulgated by professional associations. 233
Indeed, the authors of the influential antitrust treatise, Areeda and Hovenkamp,
recommend a “rule of reason [approach] for most professional rules that are
reasonably intended to promote socially valuable practices.” 234 However, the
structural inquiry that Areeda and Hovenkamp suggest for cases involving
standard-setting organizations does not adequately accommodate the unique
character of antitrust suits against state regulatory boards. 235 Although their

230 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986) (“To survive [a]
motion for summary judgment, [plaintiffs] must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused [plaintiffs] to suffer a cognizable injury.”
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))).
231 See Petri v. Va. Bd. of Med., No. 1:13-cv-01486, 2014 WL 6772478, at *3–4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014).
232 See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (explaining that under the rule of reason, “antitrust
plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in fact unreasonable and
anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful”).
233 See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1986) (cautioning against condemning rules
of professional associations under the per se standard of review).
234 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 160, ¶ 227a, at 29. For cases like N.C. Dental, where it is clear
that the agency has acted in a way that is very difficult to justify on safety or efficiency grounds, “the per se
rule” approach would supplement. Id.
235 13 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 2232a, at 444 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“[D]irect inquiries
into the ‘reasonableness’ of a challenged restraint [in the context of standard-setting] quickly involve the court
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approach appropriately recognizes that judges should attempt to refrain from
evaluating the substantive reasonableness of challenged state policies, the
structural factors in cases involving challenges to regulations promulgated by
professional regulatory boards will likely suggest either an anticompetitive
purpose or likely effect. 236 Indeed, most state medical boards are staffed with
practicing physicians that compete in overlapping geographic markets against
competitors whom they are tasked with regulating. 237
Fortunately, another pair of antitrust scholars has proposed a modified rule
of reason that addresses the nuances of cases involving state regulatory boards
and, in particular, medical boards. 238 Recognizing the inaptness of the
conventional rule-of-reason approach in antitrust suits against state licensing
boards, 239 Edlin and Haw argue that the rule-of-reason analysis should be
modified in this genre of cases. 240 They propose a three-pronged approach for
their modified rule-of-reason analysis: “[1] identifying a legitimate reason for
the licensing restriction, [2] analyzing the fit between the restriction and the
problem, and [3] inquiring into less restrictive alternatives.” 241 Addressing
these prongs in turn will reveal why, assuming non-egregious conduct, a
professional-regulator defendant should fare well in an antitrust suit.
The first prong—identifying a legitimate reason for the licensing
restriction—involves an inquiry into the social-welfare justifications of a
restriction imposed by a regulatory board. In other words, the first prong
considers whether the regulation improves health or safety. 242 Although Edlin
and Haw recognize the difficulty of measuring whether a licensing restriction
improves quality or safety, they note that “the difficulty of quantifying
competitive benefits is nothing new in rule-of-reason cases. [Accordingly,]
[p]rofessional boards should be induced to bring their best evidence of
in a morass of technical issues where neither the judge nor the jury has sufficient expertise to produce
acceptable results.”).
236 Id. at ¶ 2232d, at 452 (“The structural condition leading to the strongest inference of anticompetitive
purpose or likely effect is when all or substantially all of the decision makers are in direct competition with the
plaintiff and stand to benefit from the plaintiff’s demise or any significant restraint on its output.”).
237 See Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1108.
238 See id. at 1146.
239 Id. (“Under a conventional rule-of-reason analysis, a permissible agreement must directly enhance
competition in some way, such as when a group of copyright holders creates a new and valuable product
together. Of course, the most plausible benefits of many (and perhaps most) licensing restraints flow directly
from their limitations on competition.” (footnote omitted)).
240 Id. at 1148.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 1149.
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procompetitive effects to the suit.” 243 Indeed, this line of inquiry reflects a fair
and balanced approach and is patently reasonable, and arguably necessary,
when the antitrust defendant is a state regulatory board. Unless courts permit
social-welfare justification to be cited as procompetitive justifications, it is
hard to imagine a state medical board ever prevailing at trial. 244 Indeed, state
regulatory boards deliberately restrain competition; yet, they do so to benefit
the general public by preventing charlatanism and unscrupulous business
tactics. 245
Although the first prong seems reasonable enough, Edlin and Haw’s
application of it to a situation involving restrictions on nurse practitioners is
potentially troublesome. They contend these restrictions, which require nurse
practitioners to be supervised, ought to fail the first prong because research
does not show that the restrictions improve health care quality. 246 Perhaps the
research is correct, but that should not be the point. States can have alternative,
non-quantifiable reasons for requiring these restrictions, such as providing
reassurance to patients by requiring doctors with greater medical training to
supervise the nurse practitioners. This example illustrates the precise dangers
that an expansive interpretation of N.C. Dental poses to states’ rights to
regulate their health care industries.
The second prong—analyzing the fit between the restriction and the
problem—works in tandem with the first. If courts were to adopt the modified
rule-of-reason approach, the focus in litigation would likely center on this
prong. Edlin and Haw argue that “claims of quality improvement should be
specific and tied to a theory of market failure that justifies government
interference.” 247 This prong seems appropriate, but with two caveats. First,
when courts lack the expertise to evaluate highly technical regulations, such as
those passed by state medical boards, they should be more inclined to defer to
the board’s judgment. As long as the board provides evidence that the
regulation is not a farce, the principles underlying antitrust federalism, as
embodied in the Parker doctrine, counsel against federal courts second-

243

Id. at 1148.
Although some courts have read the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Engineers as
foreclosing consideration of public interest factors in Sherman Act cases, Edlin and Haw explain “this
rejection is neither universal nor complete.” Id. at 1146.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 1149.
247 Id. at 1148.
244
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guessing whether a policy actually serves the best interest of the public. 248
Second, in evaluating this second prong, courts should be mindful of a central
premise of the Parker doctrine: states should have flexibility in enacting
regulatory policies, and it is not the federal judiciary’s role to countenance
antitrust suits simply because a state’s regulatory policy does not comport with
efficiency-based goals. 249
The third prong of this approach—inquiring into less restrictive
alternatives—“places the restriction’s competitive burden on the
anticompetitive side of the scale, asking whether there is an alternative less
destructive to competition that achieves the same benefits.” 250 A board
considering a regulation that would effectively exclude, say, low-cost market
entrants would be well advised, at least under Edlin and Haw’s modified ruleof-reason approach, to evaluate less restrictive alternatives prior to enacting the
regulation. And this should have a beneficial effect for the antitrust defendant
even if a court conducts the structural inquiry proposed by Areeda and
Hovenkamp, for this factor is relevant to an assessment of the defendants’
anticompetitive purpose. 251
For the most part, the third prong also represents a fair approach under the
modified rule of reason. However, as with the first two prongs, the principles
underlying the Parker doctrine suggest an additional caveat. If a state board
reviews objections to a proposed regulation and provides a response explaining
why less restrictive alternatives will not adequately achieve the state’s
regulatory goals, and if the state authorizes the regulation and reviews the
board’s explanation, this should serve as persuasive evidence that the board
acted reasonably, which is an acceptable defense in antitrust cases. 252 Of
course, that latter condition approximates adequate state supervision, so this
example presumes that the board failed the first Midcal prong and, thus, must
face an antitrust trial on the merits. Whereas Edlin and Haw believe that a
court should be equally rigorous regardless of whether the board fails the first
or second prong, it seems consistent with the Parker doctrine to defer to state

248 See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“The question before us is [in cases involving Parker immunity] not whether such programs serve the public
interest.”).
249 See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 360 (1943).
250 See Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1148.
251 See supra text accompanying notes 232–34.
252 See 13 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 235, ¶ 2232a, at 444.
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agency conduct when the state has sufficiently authorized it. 253 Likewise, a
state attorney general’s approval of a board’s conduct should provide support
for a private regulator’s reasonableness defense.
Finally, applying the modified rule of reason to a recent case pending in a
federal district court in Texas illustrates its potential to frustrate states’
regulatory policies and, more fundamentally, impinge on states’ sovereignty.
In Teladoc v. Texas Medical Board, a telemedicine company sued the Texas
Medical Board under the Sherman Act for promulgating a regulation that
requires Texas citizens to receive in-person examinations prior to receiving
prescription medicine. 254 Although the board allegedly failed to adhere to
administrative rulemaking requirements, the bigger picture is important
here. 255 The board should not have to worry about threats from antitrust suits
when, in the exercise of its lawfully delegated authority and under state
supervision, it fails to perform a rigorous cost-benefit analysis or does not rule
out every less restrictive alternative. The benefits of a federalist system will be
lost if the federal judiciary permits plaintiffs to use the Sherman Act to strike at
the pocketbooks of the professionals upon whom states rely in crafting their
regulatory policies.
B. Other Avenues for Challenging Delegations to Private Actors
Yet another reason why federal courts should construe N.C. Dental
narrowly is that there are other means by which abusive occupational licensing
regimes can be curtailed. Indeed, courts have invalidated private delegations
under several different theories. 256 The Due Process Clause, for instance,
provides one source of law that can serve as “a potential limit on the private
exercise of regulatory power, especially if the regulators and the regulated
parties compete with each other.” 257 Although there is “no due process
doctrine that’s specific to private parties,” delegations to private actors can be

253 Admittedly, this situation might be rare. As Edlin and Haw point out, “[a]ny state mandate calling for
the regulation of entry and good standing in a profession is likely to meet the Court’s low bar for clear
articulation, since all licensing restricts competition by reducing the number of competing professionals in the
field.” Edlin & Haw, supra note 2, at 1122.
254 No. 1-15-CV-343 RP, 2015 WL 8773509, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2015) (“[A]sserting [that the]
Defendants have committed a violation of antitrust law, as well as the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in
adopting New Rule 190.8 and New Rule 174.”).
255 Id.
256 Volokh, supra note 2, at 932 (“In recent years, state and federal courts have been ruling against private
regulatory organizations on a number of theories.”).
257 Id. at 933.
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struck down if the delegate has a pecuniary bias. 258 For example, the Board in
N.C. Dental could have violated due process if it had disciplined North
Carolina dentists using in-house disciplinary hearings; if it had, the Board
could have been sued for “money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” 259
Another avenue is state non-delegation doctrines. Although non-delegation
challenges at the federal level are unlikely to succeed, “[s]ome states have nondelegation doctrines that are stricter than the federal one.” 260 Texas has a
particularly robust non-delegation doctrine, and plaintiffs have succeeded in
challenging private delegations under this doctrine. 261
In addition, the Texas Supreme Court recently invalidated a State
Cosmetology Board’s licensing scheme on substantive due process grounds. 262
This development can be connected to the federalism principles advocated
herein. If citizens decide to emigrate to Texas because of the favorable climate
for economic liberty, other states would have an incentive to change their
policies. 263 Importantly, this positive result can be achieved without stretching
the federal government’s authority and encroaching on states’ rights.
Assuming state boards promulgate policies in accordance with the Midcal
active supervision requirement, political accountability is protected, and the
promise of antitrust federalism remains alive and defensible.
CONCLUSION
In many respects, N.C. Dental is a praiseworthy decision: the Court
recognized the problem that occupational licensing regimes pose to our free
market economy, and it sought to resolve it. Unfortunately, the Court’s holding
might permit federal courts and the FTC to address the problem with a
hacksaw rather than a scalpel. In failing to acknowledge the particularly
egregious conduct of the North Carolina Dental Board, the majority let itself
issue an opinion with potentially far-reaching negative consequences. The old
adage that “hard facts make bad law” resonates with this decision. Although a

258

Id. at 940–41.
Id. at 952.
260 Id. at 955.
261 Id. at 933.
262 See generally Patel v. Tex. Dep’t. of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015) (basing the
court’s holding, in part, on due process grounds).
263 Conversely, if more people become sick or lose eyebrows, other states will take notice and there will
be less of an incentive to deregulate these occupations.
259
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definite standard might not have been practicable, state legislatures needed
something more precise, or even formalistic, than what the Court provided.
The federalism principles that underlie Parker cannot be reconciled with an
active supervision requirement so boundless that it permits federal agencies or
courts to impose the federal government’s normative, efficiency-based
standards in their scrutiny of states’ regulatory policies. What will be left of
economic federalism if the federal government can easily defeat the Parker
doctrine’s protections by alleging that the state has provided inadequate
supervision? Without a definite standard, the uncertainty surrounding the
holding will remain, with the likely concomitant result that professionals will
no longer serve on state boards for fear of incurring antitrust liability or
litigation hassle.
The presumption proposed here provides “realistic assurance” that the
challenged conduct is the state’s own and, further, promotes political
transparency. 264 This is sufficient to assuage the majority’s concerns in N.C.
Dental and fulfills the goal of the active supervision requirement. 265 For this
reason, courts should regard a supervisory system meeting the four constants
as presumptively adequate. Critically, such an approach is consistent with
Supreme Court precedent and alleviates many of the policy concerns and
practical difficulties implicated by the decision.
Because the Commission’s authority is trumped by the Article III courts,
whether the dire predictions elicited by N.C. Dental come to fruition will likely
hinge on how federal courts interpret and apply the decision. This Comment
has provided precedent and policy justifications for why the federal courts
should construe N.C. Dental narrowly. Limiting the scope of the active
supervision inquiry and, more generally, respecting the principles underlying
“our federalism” are crucial for the preservation of states’ rights as co-equal
sovereigns. 266 Even though excessive occupational licensing requirements
offend our notions of economic liberty, the integrity of the federal judiciary
forecloses using the Sherman Act as a quasi-substantive due process doctrine.

264

See supra text accompanying notes 200–02.
See 2016 SUPPLEMENT PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 227a, at 28 (Wolters Kluwer eds., 2016) (“[T]he concern
of the majority [was] to use federal antitrust law to provide a layer of transparency and more immediate
political control to the process.”).
266 See supra text accompanying notes 76–80.
265
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Moreover, the non-antitrust alternatives available for challenging private
regulatory delegations defeats the argument that the antitrust laws are
necessary for eradicating all forms of state-sanctioned anticompetitive
behavior—especially if the cost is undue interference with the states’ core
police powers.
The federalist system prescribed by the Constitution is not anachronistic,
and the United States has performed well as a federal republic. 267 Hopefully,
the federal judiciary will respect its role in a constitution defined by a system
of governmental checks and balances and, accordingly, maintain the vitality of
the state-action doctrine when appropriate. If it does, medical professionals
serving on state boards need not worry about the negative ramifications of N.C.
Dental. However, if the federal government treats antitrust federalism as an
unimportant remnant of colonial times and aggressively applies N.C. Dental,
we should all prepare for a world in which government bureaucrats, rather than
doctors, decide who can legally perform brain surgeries.
RICHARD F. WALKER III ∗

267 Megan Willett, The 15 Countries With the Highest Quality of Life, BUS. INSIDER (May 28, 2013, 2:36
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/top-countries-on-oecd-better-life-index-2013-5 (identifying the United
States as having the sixth highest standard of living in the world based on the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development’s Better Life Index).
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